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I. INTRODUCTION

The Sedona Conference Principles (Principles), the signature work
product of Working Group One (WG1) of the Sedona Conference, 1
provide best practice recommendations for discovery of electronically
stored information (ESI). The Principles have been widely accepted by
courts and parties alike as authoritative because they provide carefully
balanced treatment of core issues and are helpful in avoiding and
resolving disputes. 2
* Tom Allman is a former General Counsel and Chair Emeritus of the Sedona Conference Working
Group 1. He was an early advocate of comprehensive federal and state rulemaking on electronic
discovery.
1. The Sedona Conference is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) research and education group consisting
of experienced jurists, lawyers, and consultants dedicated to providing leadership in areas of antitrust
law, complex litigation, and intellectual property rights.
2. See, e.g., Morgan Hill Concerned Parents v. Calif. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:11-CV-3471 KJM
AC, 2017 WL 445722, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2017) (relying also on the Sedona Glossary, an equally
iconic Sedona Conference publication).
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A Third Edition of the Principles was released in final form in
October 2017 and is the subject of this Article. 3 Like the Second Edition
published in 2007, which reflected the impact of the 2006 e-discovery
amendments, the Third Edition channels the 2015 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules). 4 The Sedona
Conference participated in that extensive rule-making process and made
important contributions to it, while also developing the Third Edition of
the Principles.
II. THE THIRD EDITION
As the Introduction to the Third Edition of the Principles puts it,
“[n]ew issues and technologies—some not even fathomed in 2007—now
command our attention” and in and of themselves justify updates to the
Second Edition. 5 The multi-year drafting effort was guided by a
determination to do no harm to existing Principles and Commentary,
which had proven their value while, at the same time, dealing with the fact
that “some sections [of the Principles and Commentary in the 2007
Edition] had not aged well.” 6
The Foreword to the Principles traces the evolution of the Third
Edition from the time of the first drafting efforts in 2010 through the
narrowing of issues and adoption of the post-comment final revisions by
the WG1 Steering Committee in September 2017. 7 Ultimately, while
Principle 6 remained unchanged, Principles 5, 8, 13, and 14 underwent
substantial revisions in reaction to the renewed emphasis on
proportionality and the more comprehensive approach to spoliation of ESI
adopted in the 2015 Amendments. 8 In addition, Principle 12 has been
substantially revised to reflect best practices in selecting a form or forms
of production. The Third Edition also breaks new ground in advocating

3. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices,
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF.
J. 1 (2018) [hereinafter The Sedona Principles]. For the convenience of the reader, the Third Edition
of the Sedona Principles are reproduced in Appendix A.
4. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 4, 16, 26, 30, 31, 33,
34, 37, 55, and 84 and the Appendix Forms, Absent Contrary Congressional Action, 305 F.R.D. 457
(2015) [hereinafter The Proposed Rules].
5. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 28-29 (noting the explosion of Facebook, Twitter,
mobile apps, big data analytics, and cloud computing, not to mention new methods of search, retrieval,
and review methods in the form of TAR).
6. Id. at 32-33.
7. Id. at 12-16.
8. For a useful summary of differences from the Second Edition, see the Overview of Main
Changes Between the Second and Third Edition. Id. at 35-50.
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for a more holistic use of Information Governance (IG) and in its practical
advice on the use of FRE 502.
A particular strength of the Third Edition lies in its Commentaries,
most of which have been extensively revised to enhance their practicality
and ease of use. This reflects the Sedona Conference’s success in
developing a consensus approach to dealing with strongly held competing
points of view among the members of WG1.
III. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Principle 6 famously provides that a responding party is “best
situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies
appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored
information.” 9 The Sedona Conference’s commitment to this bedrock
principle of judicial restraint, proposed at the first meeting of what became
WG1, 10 remains unchanged and has important implications for the Third
Edition.
A.

Case Management

The Rules Enabling Act does not authorize enactment of procedural
rules or ad hoc judicial action that unduly interferes with the substantive
right of parties to manage their primary conduct. 11 There is only “narrowly
circumscribed” authority for courts to intervene in pretrial discovery
decisions by parties in compliance with their obligations. 12
As former Judge Francis put it in a prescient article on the topic,
“[j]udges need to be sensitive to the legal boundaries of their authority

9. Principle 6 was issued for public comment in March 2003 and, as unchanged, was included
in the First Edition issued in January 2004. It was unchanged in the Second Edition.
10. The author also suggested its use to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, which was
then soliciting comments for what ultimately became the 2006 Amendments. See, e.g., Letter from
Thomas Y. Allman to Peter McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, (Dec.
9, 2002) (“The producing party should determine the best and most reasonable approach to locating
and producing relevant electronic information during discovery.”) (copy of letter on file with author).
11. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 567
(2001) (“Another problem with the [judicial] managerial model is that . . . it lessens predictability for
litigants, who therefore may be hampered significantly in their efforts to plan their primary
behavior.”).
12. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail, 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976)
(refusing to compel parties to stipulate to facts to which they will not voluntarily agree); see also Olin
Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal
Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 404-05 (1977) (“[It risks improperly] affect[ing] behavior at the
planning as distinguished from the disputative stage of activity.”).
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[and] the practical limits of their expertise.” 13 Accordingly, Principle 6
rejects an unnecessarily intrusive juridical approach when electronic
discovery is involved. As Comment 6.a. in the Third Edition succinctly
puts it, “a responding party should determine how to meet its own
preservation and production obligations.” 14
Comment 6.a. explains that satisfying electronic discovery
obligations requires a very specific understanding of how information is
handled by an entity. 15 Neither courts nor opposing parties are typically
so equipped. Rule 26(g) provides ample means to deal with those entities
that do not act in good faith to meet their discovery obligations.
The need for appropriate judicial restraint has been recognized by
many courts applying Principle 6. 16 The Commentary on Defense of
Process summed it up well by explaining that it is “the producing party’s
prerogative and responsibility to decide the procedures, methodologies,
and technologies to use, and to live with the consequences of those
decisions.” 17
B.

Cooperation

Rule 1 was amended in 2015 to make both courts and parties
responsible for securing the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of each case. The Committee “seriously considered” but ultimately
refused to amend Rule 1 to require that parties “should cooperate to
achieve these ends.” 18 Among the reasons was uncertainty as to whether
a duty to cooperate included a mandate to compromise. 19 The Committee
Note observes that “most lawyers and parties cooperate to achieve [the
goals of Rule 1]” and that “[e]ffective advocacy is consistent with—and
indeed depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of procedure.” 20
It also eschews use of the amended rule as a new or independent basis for
sanctions.

13. James C. Francis IV, Judicial Modesty: Not an Oxymoron; The Case for Restraint in the
Electronic Age, LEGAL TECH NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013).
14. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 118.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 120 n.97 (listing cases that support this proposition).
17. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on Defense of Process:
Principles and Guidelines for Developing and Implementing a Sound E-Discovery Process (Public
Comment Version Sept. 2016), at 13.
18. Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 Civil Rules Package as Transmitted to Congress, 16 SEDONA
CONF. J. 1, 7 (2015); see also id. at 9 (citing Duke Subcomm. Initial Sketch for Rule 1).
19. Id. at 6-8 (citing Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s Evolving Duties in
Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 546 (2009)).
20. The Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 532-33.
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The Third Edition reconciles support for Principle 6 with promotion
of cooperative behavior, as championed by the aspirational 2008 Sedona
Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 21 by emphasizing the benefits of
voluntary conduct. Comment 3.b. notes, for example, that cooperation
among counsel “can enhance the meet and confer process” and foster the
overriding objective of Rule 1. 22 It describes that type of cooperation as
“fundamentally a voluntary endeavor” with a “relatively equal and
balanced exchange of non-protected information.” 23
Comment 6.b. suggests that an election to cooperate in meaningful
ways on procedures can achieve monetary savings and non-monetary
efficiencies. 24 Comment 11.a. notes that parties should be prepared to
discuss their choices of search methods, especially if there are perceived
deficiencies. 25
Courts acknowledge the limits on judicial compulsion of
cooperation. 26 In Hyles v. New York, the court concluded that
“[c]ooperation principles” do not “give the requesting party, or the Court,
the power to force cooperation or to force the responding party to use [a
particular form of computer assisted search].” 27
In response to public comments suggesting that the discussion of
cooperation in Comment 6.b. was inadequately balanced, the Drafting
Team added the observation that parties who refuse to participate in the
discovery process may weaken their ability to later challenge that
process. 28
C.

Discovery on Discovery

Comment 6.b. emphasizes that “as a general matter,” there should be
no “discovery on discovery” absent agreement between the parties or
21. The Sedona Conference, Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009
Supp.); see also The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 76-78 cmt. 3.b (providing a summary of its
adoption in 2008 and its impact after the 2015 Amendments).
22. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 76.
23. Id. at 77 (“[Attorneys] should advocate their client’s positions within the parameters of the
applicable rules.”); see also id. at 85 cmt. 3.g. (suggesting that communications with opposing counsel
and courts should be “informed and candid”).
24. Id. at 123.
25. Id. at 165.
26. Searcy v. Esurance, No. 2:15-cv-00047-APG-NJK, 2016 WL 4149964, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug.
1, 2016) (describing the amendment to Rule 1 as effort to change legal culture).
27. Hyles v. New York City, 10 Civ. 3119 (AT) (AJP), 2016 WL 4077114, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 1, 2016).
28. Cover Letter to the Sedona Principles, Third Edition, SEDONA CONF., 3 (2017),
https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/The%20Sedona%20Principles [http://perma.cc/RTA2JNJZ].
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specific indicia of a material failure by a party to meet its obligations.29
This view provoked a strong response from a member of the judiciary who
served as an observer and participant in WG1.30
The Foreword to the Third Edition of the Principles acknowledges
the particular difficulty in arriving at a consensus on the language in the
Comment given the strongly-held views presented by members who
predominantly represented opposing sides in large-scale, asymmetrical
litigation. 31
D.

Direct Access

Comment 6.d. cautions against granting direct access to electronic
systems unless the operation of the system is at issue in the case 32 and
Comment 10.e. suggests that it should be done only after a showing of
good cause. 33 It notes that court-ordered inspections present difficult
issues and should be used sparingly because of concerns about disclosure
of protected information. 34 The Comment also suggests that inspections
should be narrowly tailored to the circumstances and accompanied by
strong protective orders. 35 As noted in Comment 8.c., because the costs
and burdens involved are substantial, early discussion of alternative
approaches can be useful. 36
IV. INFORMATION GOVERNANCE
The Third Edition advocates for a holistic view of electronic
discovery planning and suggests that it would benefit from being part of
a comprehensive IG approach to management of information.
A.

Background

The importance of IG programs in the litigation context has increased
because of the explosive growth in the volumes and diversity of electronic
29. Id. at 123.
30. Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, Deconstructing “Discovery About Discovery,” 19 SEDONA CONF.
J. 215, 225 (2018) (“A judge must guard against unilaterally usurping the discovery process or delving
into technical areas beyond their control or expertise. But a court would be equally remiss in
summarily rejecting a pretrial dispute as nothing more than an immaterial discussion about ‘discovery
about discovery.”).
31. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 14.
32. Id. at 127.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 152-53.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 140-42.
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information types subject to discovery. 37 The risk is that an uncoordinated
“silo” approach to dealing with discovery of such information may
exacerbate, not mitigate, the costs and burdens involved.
The Principles suggest that organizations facing this new paradigm
should be open to the use of IG programs. It envisions a “coordinated,
inter-disciplinary approach” to address records and information
management, data privacy, information security and protection,
compliance, data governance, data storage and archiving, and electronic
discovery. 38
B.

Principle 1

The Introduction to Principle 1, which deals with ESI generally, 39
emphasizes that while discovery of relevant ESI is subject to the same
preservation and production requirements as other forms of information,
its use is “so pervasive” that it is often the driving force behind the
adoption of IG programs. 40
Comment 1.a. explains that organizations “can benefit” greatly from
effective “information governance programs that reduce the cost and risk
of meeting discovery obligations.” 41 Comment 1.b., relying on the
Commentary on Information Governance, 42 suggests that there is often a
“direct correlation” between the use of an IG program and “the ease with
which [an entity] can search, identify and produce information.” 43
The Commentary on Information Governance suggests an IG
program will enable decisions about information for the good of the
overall organization to be consistent with senior management’s strategic
directions. This contrasts with the typical “siloed approaches” to
managing information. 44

37. Id. at 8.
38. Id. at 59.
39. Id. at 56.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 59 cmt. 1.a. The author admits to a certain concern about the ease of achieving
such goals, given personal experience as a General Counsel seeking to coordinate such efforts from a
legal perspective.
42. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Information Governance, 15 SEDONA CONF. J.
125 (2014).
43. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 60 cmt. 1.b.
44. Cf. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Email Management: Guidelines for the
Selection of Retention Policy, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 239 (2007). As noted in that Commentary, a
consensus on specific best practices was virtually impossible to achieve given the diversity of
approaches in play then (and over time) among organizations represented by the drafting team
members.
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Comment 1.b. suggests practical considerations for dealing with
records schedules, disposing of ESI that “no longer needs to be retained
or preserved,” adjusting the “rotation cycle for backups,” and “limit[ing]
the size of email accounts.” 45 It also cautions that new technology should
not be adopted without considering the difficulty to preserve and produce
ESI for litigation. 46
The Comment also notes, however, that “despite the compelling
logic of IG for many organizations, adopting such a program is neither a
legal nor a business imperative.” 47 Accordingly, an organization’s
compliance with discovery obligations should not be judged by the state
or lack of an IG program. 48
C.

Principle 5

Comment 5.b. suggests that an effective IG program can
“substantially enhance” the ability to address electronic discovery
issues. 49 Even a “modestly mature IG program” typically develops indices
of its core information systems and applicationsincluding key metadata
fields, system stewards, and an inventory of legal holdsand whether
information relevant to one matter is being preserved for another. 50
The Comment explains that having “defined policies and procedures
for issuing and monitoring legal hold notices” and training on the policies
and procedures is appropriate. 51 Comment 5.c. and 5.d. emphasize the role
of “legal hold” notices to preserve relevant information, relying on the
Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger and the Process. 52
V. PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY
The emphasis on proportionality reflected in the 2015 Amendments
is addressed “expressly and liberally” throughout the Third Edition from

45. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 59-64 cmt. 1.b.
46. Id. at 62-63.
47. Id. at 61.
48. Id.; accord at 99-100 cmt. 1.b.
49. Id. at 99.
50. Id. at 98-99.
51. Id. at 100.
52. Id. at 101-08; see also The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger
& The Process, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 280-82 (2010) [hereinafter Commentary on Legal Holds].
The Drafting Team Cover Letter explains their refusal to include “detailed advice on how to meet
preservation obligations” and the related suggestion that “readers should turn to the Commentary on
Legal Holds: The Trigger & the Process for more specific guidance.” Cover Letter to the Sedona
Principles, Third Edition, supra note 28, at 2.
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preservation through production. 53 This is especially evident in amended
Principles 2, 5, 8, 11, 12, and 13 and their respective Commentaries, as
discussed below.
A.

Background

While limitations on “disproportionate” discovery in the Federal
Rules date back to 1983, the language capturing the essence of
“proportionality” was tucked away in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) until it was
moved into Rule 26(b)(1) as part of the 2015 amendment, as revised and
augmented by a new factor suggested by public comments. Rule 26(b)(1)
now requires that discovery must be both relevant to a party’s claim or
defense and “proportional to the needs of the case” while taking into
consideration proportionality factors. 54
This has had a major and salutary impact. As Chief Justice Roberts
noted in his 2015 year-end report, the 2015 Amendments have
“crystalized the concept of reasonable limits on discovery through
increased reliance on the common-sense concept of proportionality.” 55
One unintended consequence, however, is a diminution in the need to
reference Rule 26(b)(2)(B) in order to invoke proportionality objections
when ESI is sought from inaccessible sources.” 56 Not surprisingly, courts
increasingly turn to Rule 26(b)(1) for proportionality considerations rather
than dealing with the necessity of first making findings of inaccessibility
and “good cause.” 57
The Third Edition of the Principles has been careful to leave room
for both approaches, but appears to be particularly supportive of the
reliance on Rule 26(b)(1), which is, obviously, quite logical. 58 The 2017
Edition of the Commentary on Proportionality disclaims any intent to
53. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 32.
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
55. Chief Justice Roberts, 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 6 (Dec. 31, 2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/JK7GFDF3].
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (limiting the production of ESI from inaccessible sources
absent a showing of “good cause considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”). As amended in
2015, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) provides a cross-reference to the revised proportionality factors
by noting that the court must limit discovery if it determines that “the proposed discovery is outside
the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Subsections (i) and (ii) remain unchanged.
57. See, e.g., Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Chemoil Corp., No. 15-2199, 2016 WL 9051173
(C.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2016).
58. Thomas Y. Allman, The “Two-Tiered” Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule 26(b)(2)(B)
Fulfilled Its Promise? 14 Rich. J.L. & Tech, 7, *2 (2008) (“Whether a source is ‘reasonably
accessible’ or not, the ‘proportionality principle’ found in [then] Rule 26(b)(2)(C)  weighing the
perceived benefits against the burdens involved  may prevent discovery from being ordered.”).
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comment on the relationship between proportionality and Rule
26(b)(2)(B). 59
B.

Principle 2

Principle 2 provides that courts and parties should use the
“proportionality standard” embodied in amended Rule 26(b)(1) and its
state equivalents when assessing cost and burdens regarding preservation
and production of ESI.
Comment 2.a. describes the newly amended Rule as involving a
“balancing test” that requires more than consideration of just “the amount
in controversy” 60 and reinforces the Rule 26(g) obligation to consider
proportionality in making discovery requests, responses, and objections. 61
Comment 2.b. emphasizes that proportionality considerations apply
to all aspects of the discovery of ESI, including not only preservation and
production, but also to searches for likely relevant ESI; reviews for
relevancy, privilege, and confidentiality; preparation of privilege logs; the
staging, form(s), and scheduling of production; and data delivery
specifications. 62 The Comment notes that the proportionality factors may
also impact cost allocation. 63
Comment 2.e. distinguishes the use of a “proportionality” objection
under Rule 26(b)(1) from an objection lodged to production from
inaccessible sources under Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 64 It explains that a
proportionality objection is different, even though some of the same cost
and burden considerations apply, because if the balance of factors under
Rule 26(b)(1) tips against discovery being proportional, the discovery is
impermissible. 65 Rule 26(b)(1) also permits the assessment of the burden
of collecting, reviewing, hosting, and producing ESI, not just the burden
of accessing the ESI. 66

59. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 18
SEDONA CONF. J. 141 n.11 (2017) [hereinafter Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic
Discovery] (“This Commentary does not address the relationship between proportionality and . . .
[l]imitations . . . that apply under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B).”).
60. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 65-66.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 67.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 69.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Principle 5

Principle 5 states that parties must make reasonable and good faith
efforts to preserve ESI that is expected to be relevant to claims or
defenses, but that it is “unreasonable to expect parties to take every
conceivable step or disproportionate steps” to preserve each instance of
relevant ESI. 67 By its terms, the Principle requires preservation only of
“relevant” ESI, in contrast to the Second Edition, which spoke of a duty
to preserve ESI which “may be” relevant.68 Under amended Rule 26(b)(1),
only non-privileged information that is “relevant to any party’s claim or
defense” is discoverable. 69
Comment 5.a. notes that the change in Principle 5 in the Third
Edition is intended to emphasize, as required by the 2015 amendments to
the Federal Rules, that “all discovery must be proportional to the needs of
the case.” 70 However, while parties may unilaterally refuse to preserve
ESI if the costs and burdens of doing so are disproportionate, there is some
“risk” involved if a court ultimately disagrees exercising hindsight. It
advocates, as a safer course, for parties to engage in a meaningful
discussion consistent with the cooperation principles and to agree on how
the preservation and notice efforts may be scaled back in acknowledgment
of the competing needs involved. 71
Comment 5.e. notes that courts should not order “heroic or unduly
burdensome”
preservation,
unlessapplying
proportionality
considerationsthere is a substantial likelihood that ESI (or its
substantial equivalent) cannot be found in a more accessible data source.72
The Comment goes on to illustrate its point through a hypothetical
involving backup tapes, sampling, and an illusion to the possibility of
allocating costs of the recovery. 73 Comment 5.h. suggests that, absent
good cause, preservation obligations should not extend to disaster
recovery storage systems created in the ordinary course of business 74 and

67. Id. at 51.
68. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles, Second Edition: Best Practices,
Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, SEDONA CONF., at
ii (June 2007) [hereinafter The Sedona Principles, Second Edition].
69. See, e.g., Snider v. Danfoss, LLC, 15 CV 4748, 2017 WL 2973464, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July
12, 2017) (“[There is a] lack of a need to even produce irrelevant ESI, let alone preserve it.”).
70. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 95.
71. Id. at 96-97.
72. Id. at 109.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 113.
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that whether ESI on backups is subject to discovery “should be
determined by the usual proportionality principles.” 75
The Sedona Conference Commentary on Preservation, Management
and Identification of Sources of Information that are Not Reasonably
Accessible, which is cross-referenced after Comment 5.a., 76 also suggests
the use of proportionality factors in pre-litigation decisions on
preservation of inaccessible sources of ESI. 77
D.

Principle 8

Principle 8 identifies the “primary sources” of ESI for preservation
and production as those which are “readily accessible in the ordinary
course.” 78 It posits these sources as the head of a continuum of less
accessible sources along which parties should move until it is no longer
proportional to do so. 79 This “readily accessible” continuum is intended
to reflect both the “increased emphasis on proportionality under amended
Rule 26(b)(1)” and “the deeper analysis” of data sources under Rule
26(b)(2)(B) that are claimed “not to be reasonably accessible.” 80
Comment 8.a. describes the primary sources of information as those
which are routinely accessed in the ordinary course through ordinary
means. 81 Preservation or production from less accessible sources along
the continuum should be required only on a showing of good cause
(including a demonstration that the discovery is proportional) with the
requesting party bearing the burden to show good cause on an appropriate
motion. 82
Comment 8.b. is devoted to a discussion of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which
it describes as “related to but distinct from, the concept of
proportionality.” 83 It points out that after the 2015 amendments, ESI that
is not proportional to the needs of the case is not within the scope of
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) and that even if ESI is proportional a party

75. Id. at 114.
76. Id. at 98.
77. The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Preservation, Management and Identification of
Sources of Information that are Not Reasonably Accessible, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 281, 285-94 (2009).
78. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52.
79. Id. (“Only when electronically stored information is not available through such primary
sources should parties move down a continuum of less accessible sources until the information
requested to be preserved or produced is no longer proportional.”).
80. Id. at 135 n.112.
81. Id. at 135.
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id. at 138.
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may assert that it is not reasonably accessible. 84 The Comment also notes
that if a party has determined that the only source of some proportional
and relevant ESI is one that is not accessible, it may be required to
preserve that source, but “proportionality may also dictate that costs are
allocated to the requesting party when the burden to preserve or produce
ESI is disproportionate to the needs of the case.” 85
E.

Principle 11

In supporting the proposition that a responding party may satisfy its
obligations in connection with preservation and production by using
technology and process, Comment 11.a. stresses that courts should
“encourage and promote” the use of technology and process to ensure that
costs and burdens are “proportional to the needs of the case.” 86
F.

Principle 12

Comment 12.b.iii. stresses the importance of objecting to any request
for a form or forms of production a party believes is not proportional to
the needs of the case and also affirmatively stating an alternative form or
forms. 87 If a meet and confer is not successful in resolving the matter, it
may seek a protective order under rule 26(c). 88
G.

Principle 13

Principle 13 provides that the costs of preserving and producing
“relevant and proportionate” ESI ordinarily should be borne by the
responding party. 89 The Comments to the Principle speak of the authority
to allocate such costs when the burden is undue and for good cause, under
amended Rule 26(c) and emphasize the role of proportionality in
determining if such requests should be granted. 90

84.
85.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 140. See infra Part IX for more information on the role of proportionality in Principle

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 164-68.
Id. at 182.
Id. See infra Part VIII for more discussion on Principle 12.
The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52.
See infra Part IX for more information on Principle 13.

13.
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VI. SAFEGUARDING ESI
Principle 10 encourages parties to take “reasonable steps” to
safeguard ESI, the disclosure of which is subject to privileges, work
product protections, privacy obligations, or other legally enforceable
restrictions. 91
The text and Commentary were substantially revised in the Third
Edition to reflect the enactment of FRE 502, as well as to emphasize the
ethical obligations of counsel. It also acknowledges and advocates for the
use of technology assisted review (TAR) in seeking to identify privileged
information while disclaiming endorsement of its effectiveness in doing
so. Additionally, it identifies emerging privacy concerns as worthy of
concern.
A.

Background

Given the volumes of ESI that are collected and produced in
discovery, there is a substantial risk that inadvertent production of
privileged or work-product ESI may “waive” that protection. Parties have
historically mitigated this risk by undertaking manual review prior to
production and by entering into agreements to permit post-production
assertion of privilege.
The 2006 Amendments added a mechanism to facilitate this process
in Rule 26(b)(5)(B) and Rule 45(e)(2) by mandating that a recipient must
promptly “return, sequester, or destroy” copies when a post-production
claim of privilege or “trial preparation material” is made. 92 The Rule did
not, however, address the possibility of waiver. Instead, Rules 26(f) and
16(b) encouraged parties to consider entering into voluntary agreements
whereby parties agree that inadvertent production does not waive the
privilege as between themselves. 93
However, in Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 94 the court noted that
the 2006 Amendments did not and could not eliminate the risk of “waiver
or forfeiture of privilege/work product protection” 95 in jurisdictions which
apply a “strict accountability” test.96 The court suggested that parties
91. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52.
92. See FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(5)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(e)(2).
93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s notes to 2006 amendment (expressing the
view that a party which receives information under such an agreement cannot “in most circumstances”
assert waiver).
94. Hopson v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005).
95. Id. at 233 (“Absent a definitive ruling on the waiver issue, no prudent party would agree to
follow the procedures recommended in the [then] proposed rule.”).
96. Id. at 235-36.
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should assume a “complete pre-production review was always
required.” 97
The enactment of FRE 502 required Congressional action since it
involved an evidentiary privilege, 98 which was granted. 99
B.

Principle 10

Comment 10.a. advocates use of FRE 502 and its state law
equivalents and Comment 10.b. outlines the protections available under
it, cautioning that the Rule has important practical limitations. 100
Comment 10.c. suggests that parties should use court ordered
agreements of a type authorized by FRE 502(d) which, if incorporated
into a court order, preclude waiver of disclosed information, inadvertent
or not, in the pending action and in other federal or state proceedings.101
Courts have ordered inclusion of a non-waiver provision in a protective
order over the objection of one of the parties. 102 Some courts enter blanket
502(d) orders as a matter of course. 103
This is preferable to relying solely on FRE 502(b), which precludes
waiver by “inadvertent” production only if the holder “took [both]
reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and “promptly took reasonable
steps to rectify the error.” 104 In First Technology Capital v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, a court found that a waiver had occurred despite FRE 502(b),
since there was “hasty review and no functional measures” undertaken to
keep sequestered papers separate. 105

97. Id. at 244.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2012).
99. See Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537 (2008); see generally id. (Letter Addendum to
Committee Note and Statement of Congressional Intent regarding FRE 502).
100. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 147-49.
101. Id. at 150-51.
102. Rajala v. McGuire Woods, No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582, at *7 (D. Kan. July
22, 2010) (entering claw back order over objection which bars waiver even if the producing party
“ha[s] not taken reasonable care to prevent disclosure”); see also FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory
committee’s notes (“Party agreement should not be a condition of enforceability of a federal court’s
order.”).
103. The Commentary cites to The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Protection of
Privileged ESI, App. E, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 95 (2016) for a Model Rule 502(d) Order.
104. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
105. First Technology Capital v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 5:12-CV-289-KSF-REW, 2013
WL 7800409, *4-5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2013) (explaining that while the attorney “actually did turn
each page” the fact that he spent only 4.1 hours on 1500 documents and missed 45 privileged
documents made the court “dubious” that it was a reasonable investment of time to identify, study the
author and recipients, review the subject matter, assess for privilege, gauge for exceptions, and make
final decisions).
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Comment 10.f. cautions that “quick peek” agreements should not be
entered lightly and their use “should have the voluntary consent of the
producing party.” 106
C.

Privilege Review

Comment 10.g. recommends that parties consider using “search
terms and . . . TAR for privilege reviews” and, if an agreement exists or
confidence level is high, consider withholding that ESI without further
privilege review. 107 After criticism of the excessive sweep of the initial
draft comment during the public comment period, the Drafting Team
edited Comment 10.g. “to clarify that WG1 is not taking a position on the
effectiveness of . . . TAR for privilege review.” 108
In Hyles v. New York City, the court concluded that while “TAR is
the best and most efficient search tool,” it “cannot, and will not, force” a
party to use TAR . 109 The author of the opinion, who served as the Judicial
Participant in the drafting of the Third Edition, also cautioned that
“[t]there may come a time when TAR is so widely used that it might be
unreasonable for a party to decline to use [it].” 110
D.

Ethical Obligations

Comment 10.i. identifies ethical obligations applicable to counsel
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including the 2012
amendments to the Comment to Rule 1.1. 111Comment 11.c. hints at one
possible example without arguing that it is an ethical requirement. 112 It
states that collection procedures, whether automated or manual, “must be
directed and overseen by legal counsel.” 113
While consistent with comments in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
(Zubulake V) about counsel’s responsibility for a client’s duty to

106. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 153-56.
107. Id. at 156-58.
108. Cover Letter to the Sedona Principles, Third Edition, supra note 28, at 3. An expert in the
field has pointed out to the author that the effectiveness is highly dependent on such considerations
as to whether the TAR application is or is not capable of utilizing metadata which can be crucial to
privilege reviews.
109. Hyles v. New York City, 10 Civ. 3119 (AT) (AJP), 2016 WL 4077114, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 1, 2016).
110. Id.
111. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 160-62.
112. Id. at 167-68.
113. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/10

16

Allman: The Sedona Principles

2017]

THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES

905

preserve, 114 it may sweep too broadly. In Qualcomm v. Broadcom, a court
that initially sanctioned outside counsel for a failure to adequately oversee
client collection and production subsequently vacated those sanctions
after several years of discovery enabled closer attention to the dynamics
of relationship between client and counsel. 115
E.

Privacy

Comment 10.j. suggests that parties should be aware of and seek to
identify and protect personal privacy, trade secret, and confidential ESI
from unlawful or inappropriate disclosure. 116 It mentions recent Sedona
Conference publications dealing with treatment of privacy rights in
personal data. 117
VII. SEARCH TECHNOLOGY
Principle 11 provides that a party may satisfy its good faith
obligations to preserve and produce relevant ESI by the use of
“technology and processes” such as sampling, searching, or the use of
selection criteria. 118
A.

Background

At the time of publication of the Second Edition of the Principles,
the iPhone had just been introduced 119 and advanced search techniques
were evolving. The potential that technological innovations can assist in
discovery is now clear. The 2015 Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(1), for
example, suggests that courts and parties should be willing to consider the
114. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); cf. In re Pfizer, 288
F.R.D. 297, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Showers v. Pfizer, Inc.
(In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig.) 819 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 2016) (“My research has not disclosed any Second
Circuit precedent that places the duty to preserve on a party’s counsel.”).
115. See Qualcomm v. Broadcom, No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932, (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7,
2008), vacated in part by No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008),
order declining to impose sanctions, No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2,
2010); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Achieving an Appropriate Balance: The Use of Counsel Sanctions
in Connection with E-Discovery Misconduct, 15 RICH. J. LAW & TECH. 9 (2009) (discussing the duty
to take reasonable and appropriate measures to assure that client meets discovery obligations).
116. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 163-64 cmt. 10.j.
117. Reference is made to The Sedona Conference, Practical In-House Approaches to CrossBorder Discovery & Data Protection, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 397 (2016) and to The Sedona Conference,
Commentary on Privacy and Information Security: Principles and Guidelines for Lawyers, Law
Firms, and Other Legal Service Providers, 17 SEDONA CONF. J. 1 (2016).
118. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52.
119. Id. at 62 n.32.
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opportunities for reducing the burden or expense of discovery as “reliable
means” of “computer-based” methods of search become available. 120
B.

Principle 11

Principle 11 refers to the use of “technology and processes” instead
of the earlier reference to “electronic tools and processes” as used in the
Second Edition. 121
Comment 11.a. argues that the use of technology in the search for
relevant ESI is reasonable and can create cost and time savings. 122 It states
no preferences for the type of technology, but does note in a footnote that
it may be more useful to employ TAR in investigations and litigation in
culling information than “more traditional search terms.” 123 In contrast, in
cases involving a specific patent design, search terms may be “perfectly
adequate.” 124
No cross-reference is made to the discussion in Comment 10.g.,
which suggests that parties should consider the use of TAR in privilege
reviews. However, the Sedona Conference has released a comprehensive
TAR Case Law Primer, 125 which courts have found useful in deciding the
appropriate sequencing of keyword searches and predictive coding. 126
Comment 11.a. suggests, citing the Commentary on Proportionality
in Electronic Discovery, that parties should be prepared to explain their
choice of search methods absent agreement when there are “perceived
deficiencies” and should ensure that costs and burdens are proportional to
the needs of the case. 127 Comment 11.b. supports the use of sampling to
help narrow the search and references the Sedona Commentary on the Use
of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery. 128

120. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
121. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52; cf. with The Sedona Principles, Second Edition,
supra note 68, at ii.
122. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 164-66.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 165 n.132.
125. The Sedona Conference, TAR Case Law Primer, 18 SEDONA CONF. J. 1 (2017).
126. See, e.g., FCA U.S. LLC v. Cummins, No. 16-12883, 2017 WL 2806896 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
28, 2017) (relying on the Sedona TAR Case Law Primer in concluding that applying TAR to the
universe of electronic material before any keyword searches is the preferred method of reducing the
universe of material).
127. Commentary on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, supra note 59.
128. The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information
Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 217 (2014).
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VIII. FORM OF PRODUCTION
Principle 12 provides that production of ESI “should be made in the
form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or that is reasonably
useable given the nature of the [ESI] and the proportional needs of the
case.” 129 This is a substantial clarification of what turned out to be an
unnecessarily complex statement of the Principle in the Second Edition.
A.

Background

As part of the 2006 Amendments, Rule 34(b)(E)(ii) was added to
provide that in the absence of an agreement or court order, ESI should be
produced, as a default matter, “in the form or forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms.” 130 Rule
34(b)(B)-(d) outlines a process of identification and counter-identification
of preferred form or forms while placing no initial burden on the
requesting party to make a choice, but permitting any choices it made to
govern in the absence of objection by the producing party. 131
The Second Edition version of Principle 12, picking up on a
relatively modest observation in the 2006 Committee Note to Rule 34,
suggested that courts should take into account the need to produce
reasonably accessible metadata that would enable the receiving party to
have the “same ability to access, search, and display the information as
the producing party.” 132
Unfortunately, some courts interpreted this comment to suggest that
native production was necessary in all cases. 133 As the Overview of Main
Changes Between the Second and Third Edition (Overview of Main
Changes) section to the Third Edition explains, however, only some ESI
and some metadata may be needed to render the ESI as produced
reasonably usable. 134 This was not adequately explained in the Comments
to the Second Edition. 135

129. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 52.
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(E)(ii).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)-(d).
132. The Sedona Principles, Second Edition, supra note 68, at ii.
133. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 108 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Plaintiffs were entitled
to . . . [ESI] in native format with their associated metadata.”).
134. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 46 (“ESI relevant to a matter may reside in an
enormously complex system, of which only some ESI and some metadata is relevant to the case or
needed to render the ESI produced reasonably usable.”).
135. Id. at 46-48. In contrast, the Third Edition covers the same topic by providing what is
essentially a mini-treatise on the topic which is accurate, easy to read, and very practical.
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Principle 12

Principle 12 in the Third Edition provides that production should be
made in the default form or forms of production identified in Rule 34
(b)(E)(ii) given the nature of ESI and the proportional needs of the case. 136
Comment 12.b. stresses that parties should agree on the form or
forms for production early, as recommended in both Principles 3 and 4
and by Rule 26(f). 137 However, absent such agreement, ESI may be
produced in a form that is reasonably usable. It need not be produced in
its native format, since there are other ways to give the party the ability to
access and search it and make it reasonably useable.
As the Comment explains, the most common form of production, for
more than a decade, has been to create a static electronic image in Tagged
Image File Format (TIFF) or Adobe Portable Document (PDF), place the
extracted text from the document into a text file, and place the selected
metadata and other non-apparent data into one or more separate load
files. 138 This is frequently referred to as “TIFF, Text and Load Files” or
“TIFF+.”
In Aguilar v. ICE, the court noted that appropriate search
functionality could be achieved by producing memoranda, emails, and
electronic records in PDF or TIFF format accompanied by a load file
containing searchable text and selected metadata. 139
Comment 12.b. stresses that parties should not demand forms of
production, including native files and metadata fields “for which they
have no practical use or that do not materially aid in the discovery
process,” since “TIFF+ is ‘a reasonably usable’ form of production for
most purposes and types of ESI.” 140 There must be a “demonstrably
reasonable need” before native production is required. 141
Comment 12.b.i. acknowledges that some courts have ruled that
production of static electronic images without text and load files is not
reasonably usable and is therefore impermissible under Rule
34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 142 However, it explains that a requesting party need not be
136. Id. at 46.
137. See id. at 79-87. Comment 4.a. suggests that requesting parties should include technical
details about particular field or types of metadata sought, and be prepared to explain its preferences
at a meet and confer. Comment 3.c. suggests that parties should be prepared to discuss “data delivery
specifications” such as necessary metadata fields, load files, text extraction, redactions, deduplication, and exception handlings.
138. Id. at 172.
139. Aguilar v. ICE, 255 F.R.D. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
140. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 171-74.
141. Id. at 174-77.
142. Id. at 174-76.
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able to access the data in the same matter in which a responding party can
access or search its own data in the ordinary course of conducting its
business. The “same ability” requirement in the 2006 Committee Note,
properly understood, refers to the context of prosecuting and defending
the claims and defenses at issue, not how it is used in the business
operations of the producing party; it depends on the type of ESI involved
and the needs of the case. 143
Comment 12.b.ii. also explains that while it may be appropriate to
produce certain types of ESI in native formatsuch as spreadsheets,
portable database files, audio/video files, and, on occasion, even
presentation filesthere can be serious disadvantages from the lack of
page-level Bates numbering and the need for equipment or expertise to
use such applications. 144 It provides useful illustrations of how partial
native format file production can be accomplished.
An important consideration, of course, is the proportionality of the
effort involved. The Supreme Court of Texas in State Farm Lloyds has
noted that that courts should exercise their discretion, which exists absent
agreement, to choose among the alternative forms that are most useful in
the context, with “proportionality [a]s the polestar.” 145
Comment 12.b.ii. addresses the need to take extraordinary
preservation measures, such as preserving hard drive or system logs when
it is reasonably foreseeable that unique information likely to be material
to the claims or defensesis involved. 146
C.

Labeling Responses

The production of ESI is exempt from the requirement under Rule
34(b)(2)(E)(i) that production of documents must be labeled to correspond
to categories in the request.147 Among other reasons, production of
common metadata and source fields in a load file in accordance with
subsection (ii) should suffice to permit the requesting party to sort and
filter the materials to determine how the materials were kept. 148

143. Id. at 174-175 (discussing how the Sedona Conference drafters moved beyond restating the
then-current FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)).
144. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 177-78.
145. In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 615 (Tex. 2017) (applying federal
proportionality principles because they are consistent with and determinative of similar Texas limiting
principles).
146. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 177-80.
147. Id. at 182-84.
148. See, e.g., Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., 298 F.R.D 514, 527 (D.N.M. 2014)
(“[P]arties are entitled to the guarantees of (E)(i) or (E)(ii), but not both.”).
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IX. COST ALLOCATION
Principle 13 states that “[t]he costs of preserving and producing
relevant and proportionate electronically stored information ordinarily
should be borne by the responding party.” 149 As was the case with
Principle 12, this is a substantial change from the version of Principle 13
that appeared in the Second Edition.
A.

Background

Although parties presumptively bear their own costs of discovery,
courts have long acknowledged the authority of courts to deal with undue
burdens and expense in the course of discovery by shifting costs.150 In
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (Zubulake I), for example, the court explained
that Rule 26(c), when coupled with the proportionality test of Rule 26(b),
permitted it to consider cost-shifting of electronic discovery for
production from storage media such as backup tapes containing ESI which
were not reasonably accessible. 151 It also formulated a seven factor test
for courts to use in making that assessment. 152
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), adopted as part of the 2006 Amendments, provides
that when a party is ordered to produce ESI from an inaccessible source
for good cause the court “may specify conditions for the discovery.” 153
The 2006 Committee Note explained that this could “include payment by
the requesting party of part or all of the costs of obtaining information.” 154
However, this approach can be cumbersome in execution, given that it
cannot be considered without first showing that the ESI is inaccessible
and is followed by a demonstration that good cause exists to order
production, which involves consideration of proportionality issues.
As part of the 2015 Amendments, changes were made to Rule 26(c)
to acknowledge that a court may specify “the allocation of expenses” as
necessary to deal with “undue burden or expense.” 155 The Committee
149. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 53.
150. Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (“Under [the discovery] rules,
the presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests, but he may invoke the district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting
him from ‘undue burden or expense’ in doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the
requesting party’s payment of the costs of discovery.”).
151. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[W]hether
production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns primarily on whether it is kept in
an accessible or inaccessible format.”).
152. Id. at 70.
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
154. Committee Note, reproduced at 234 F.R.D. 219, 335 (2006).
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B).
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Note explains that while authority to do so already exists, its explicit
recognition in the rule clarifies its availability without implying that costshifting “should become a common practice.” 156
The availability of this more straightforward “allocation” process has
meant that courts may rely on the authority of Rule 26(c), not Rule
26(b)(2)(B), while still employing a variant of the multi-factor costshifting test from Zubulake I invoking proportionality considerations 157 to
determine if allocation of costs of producing ESI is appropriate. 158 This is
available even when the technical attributes forming barriers to
production do not create the requisite lack of accessibility to qualify under
Rule 26(b)(2)(B). 159
B.

Principle 13

Principle 13 in the Second Edition providedin terminology
inspired by Rule 26(b)(2)(B)that the responding party should bear the
reasonable costs of retrieving and reviewing ESI, unless it was not
reasonably available in the ordinary course of business, in which case
those costs could be shared or shifted. 160 This caveat has been dropped
from the Third Edition, which simply provides that the costs of producing
and preserving “relevant and proportionate” ESI should ordinarily be
borne by the producing party. 161
Principle 13 pointedly ignores the cost-shifting authority available
under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) in favor of the use of Rule 26(c) for that purpose.
According to the Overview of the Main Changes section of the Principles,
156. Committee Note, reproduced at 305 F.R.D. 457, 556 (2015) (“Authority to enter such
orders is included in the present rule, and courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition
will forestall the temptation some parties may feel to contest this authority. Recognizing the authority
does not imply that cost-shifting should become a common practice. Court and parties should continue
to assume that a responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.”).
157. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (listing seven
factors).
158. See North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys. v. Multiplan, Inc., 2018 WL 1515711, at
*12-15 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 28, 2018).
159. See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(explaining that databases did not qualify as not reasonably accessible because the costs and burdens
of production were not associated with some “technological feature that inhibits accessibility”).
160. The Sedona Principles, Second Edition, supra note 68, at ii. (“Absent a specific objection,
party agreement or court order, the reasonable costs of retrieving and reviewing electronically stored
information should be borne by the responding party, unless the information sought is not reasonably
available to the responding party in the ordinary course of business. If the information sought is not
reasonably available to the responding party in the ordinary course of business, then, absent special
circumstances, the costs of retrieving and reviewing such electronic information may be shared by or
shifted to the requesting party.”).
161. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 53.
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Principle 13 has been “updated” to reflect the Federal Rules’ treatment of
cost allocation and its interplay with the proportionality analysis under
Rule 26(b). 162
Comment 13.a. states that “[i]f the result of the proportionality
analysis clearly demonstrates that the requested discovery is appropriately
proportional, the discovery should be allowed with the presumption that
costs will not be allocated among the parties. Conversely, if the result of
the proportionality analysis clearly demonstrates that the requested
discovery is not proportional, and the request is not within the permissible
scope of discovery, the request should be denied and cost allocation would
not apply.” 163 The Comment suggests that only if the results of a
proportionality analysis are not clear cut does the court retain discretion
to allocate some or all of the costs to the requesting party. 164
Comment 13.a. also lists six factors for use in determining if
allocation should be made under those circumstances, based on a
restatement of the Zubulake factors, with one exception. 165 The Comment
acknowledges that while certain of the listed factors also bear on the
proportionality analysis, they are “intended to be weighed separately” in
determining if cost allocation is appropriate. 166
Comment 13.c. emphasizes that when disproportionate demands or
requests are made, the courts should deny the discovery, not order it to
take place with cost-allocation, providing illustrations of possible results
involving backup tapes which depend on the degree of burden balanced
by the likelihood of finding unique ESI not available elsewhere. 167
Comment 13.b. suggests that the costs of preservation of ESI should
be allocated only in “extraordinary circumstances.” 168 It appropriately
stresses that courts should also discourage burdensome preservation
demands that have no reasonable prospect of producing material
assistance to the fact finder. 169

162. Id. at 48 (ignoring Rule 26(b)(2)(B) authority but also not rejecting its continued viability
as an alternative source of authority for cost-shifting).
163. Id. at 188
164. Id. (“If, however, the result of the proportionality analysis is not clear cut, the court has
discretion to allocate some or all of the costs to the requesting party. See Principle 8.”).
165. Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), with The
Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 187 cmt. 13.a. (adopting six of the Zubulake factors essentially
verbatim, with the exception of “[t]he relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information”).
166. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 188-89.
167. Id. at 190.
168. Id. at 189.
169. Id.
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X. SPOLIATION
Principle 14 has been materially revised to provide that a court may
address a breach of duty to preserve ESI by “remedial measures,
sanctions, or both” and while remedial measures are “appropriate to cure
prejudice,” the use of sanctions “are appropriate only if a party acted with
intent to deprive another party of the use of relevant ESI.” 170 According
to the Overview of the Main Changes section of the Principles, Principle
14 has been “revised to reflect evolving case law and the 2015 amendment
to Rule 37(e). . . .” 171
A.

Background

Prior to the 2006 Amendments, the Federal Rules did not address the
common law duty to preserve, nor did it provide measures for its breach.
Federal courts largely relied upon their inherent authority to deal with
spoliation, which led to the various circuits evolving rules that were not
consistent, especially in assessing the degree of culpability sufficient to
sustain an adverse inference as to the contents of missing evidence.
For example, the Second Circuit held in Residential Funding v.
DeGeorge Financial Corp. that a negligent failure to preserve ESI was
sufficient to justify an inference that the missing information was adverse
to the non-moving party. 172 Other circuits disagreed. 173
As part of the 2006 Amendments, Rule 37(f), subsequently
renumbered as Rule 37(e), made a largely ineffectual attempt to bring
uniformity to spoliation of ESI by prohibiting rule-based sanctions for
losses of ESI due to routine, good faith operations of information
systems. 174 However, since it governed only rule-based sanctions, courts
simply ignored the Rule by relying on their inherent authority.
Subsequently, when the Rules Committee revisited the issue after the
2010 Duke Litigation Conference, it focused on providing authority for
measures for the loss of ESIwhich should have been preservedand

170. Id. at 53 (“The breach of a duty to preserve electronically store information may be
addressed by remedial measures, sanctions, or both: remedial measures are appropriate to cure
prejudice; sanctions are appropriate only if a party acted with intent to deprive another party of the
use of relevant electronically stored information.”).
171. Id. at 49 (noting that since the revised Principle is intended to provide guidance, not serve
as a restatement, it varies in certain respects from the amended Rule).
172. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002).
173. See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing, 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Mere
negligence . . . is not enough because it does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak
case.”); accord MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 273 at 660-61 (1972).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
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specifying the degree of culpability required for harsh measures. The
Sedona Conference suggested adoption of a uniform standard of
culpability requiring that a party must have “acted with ‘specific intent’
to deprive an opposing party of material evidence.” 175
Amended Rule 37(e) reflects that Sedona Conference suggestion. It
requires a showing of an “intent to deprive another party of the
information’s use in the litigation” before such measures may be imposed
for breach of a duty to preserve. 176 This has had a substantial clarifying
impact, 177 although some courts have ignored the requirement. 178
B.

Principle 14

In the Second Edition, the Comments to Principle 14 made it clear
that in the Sedona Conference’s view an unintentional destruction of
relevant ESI was not sufficient to justify sanctions. 179
Principle 14 in the Third Edition has therefore adopted the “intent to
deprive” culpability requirement of amended Rule 37(e) because it is
“aligned” with the previously articulated views of WG1. 180
Comment 14.b. provides that a party must show that the ESI: (1)
should have been preserved, (2) has been lost because the party failed to
take reasonable steps to preserve, and (3) cannot be restored or replaced
by additional discovery. 181 As the Comment puts it, no remedy is available
if a party had no duty to preserve, if the relevant ESI is still available, or
if the relevant ESI was lost despite the party having taken reasonable steps
to preserve. 182
175. Letter from Kenneth J. Withers (on behalf of SG1 Steering Committee), (Nov. 26, 2013)
at 13. The written comments, including that of the Sedona Conference, are archived at,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002.
176. FED R. CIV. P. 37(e); see also Thomas Y. Allman, What’s New and What’s Next for
Spoliation, 101, 2, JUDICATURE 47 (2017), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/
judicialstudies/judicature/may2017_rule37.pdf [http://perma.cc/2G86-689E].
177. Thomas Y. Allman, Amended Rule 37(e): Case Summaries, (May 27, 2017), App. A,
https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/judicature/2017rule37etodaycasesum
maries.pdf [http://perma.cc/47XB-FR9L].
178. Id. at App. B (noting at requests for adverse inferences which would apparently have been
denied had the Rule been applied).
179. The Sedona Principles, Second Edition, supra note 68, at 70 cmt. 14.a. (“[N]either
spoliation findings nor sanctions should issue without proof of a knowing violation of an established
duty to preserve or produce electronically stored information or a reckless disregard amount to gross
negligence.”).
180. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 193-94 cmt. 14.a. (“Having clarified that
unintentional destruction of relevant ESI is not sufficient to trigger the imposition of spoliation
sanctions, Rule 37(e) is now aligned in that respect with The Sedona Principles.”).
181. Id. at 194 cmt. 14.b.
182. Id.
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Compliance with the “reasonable steps” requirement is often
accomplished by notification of persons likely to have relevant
information as well as those in control of other sources of relevant ESI. 183
This may involve use of a “legal hold notice” as discussed in the
Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process. 184
As noted in that Commentary, the notice should be conveyed in “an
appropriate form, which may be written.” 185 It is not the case, as was
suggested in Pension Committee, subsequently abrogated in Chin v. Port
Authority, that a failure to use a litigation hold alone justifies spoliation
sanctions. 186 The court in Bouchard v. USTA, for example, noted that the
absence of a litigation hold was not dispositive because the party had
otherwise complied with its preservation obligations. 187
C.

Measures Available

Remedial measures, as described in Comment 14.c., are available to
redress prejudice, provided that they are no greater than necessary to do
so. 188 The Comment stresses that they should not be applied in order to
punish nor should they put the party that lost the relevant ESI in a better
position than it would have been if the lost relevant ESI had been
produced. 189
Comment 14.d. explains that sanctions are appropriate only upon a
showing of “intent to deprive.” 190 Only an intentional loss or destruction
of evidence logically gives rise to an inference that the evidence was
unfavorable to the party responsible for its loss. 191
Comment 14.d. asserts that Principle 14 differs from Rule 37(e) in
respect to treatment of the “incompetent spoliator,” giving as an example
a required payment of a fine to the court to deter future behavior where

183. Id. at 101-03 cmt. 5.c.
184. Commentary on Legal Holds, supra note 52, at 271-74.
185. Id. at 282-83 (noting that while use of a written legal hold is often appropriate, it is simply
one method of executing preservation obligations, not the only one).
186. Chin v. Port Authority, 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2d Cir. 2012), abrogated by Pension Comm. v.
Banc of America, 685 F.Supp.2d 456, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“rejecting” the “notion” that a failure to
institute a litigation hold constitutes negligence per se).
187. Bouchard v. USTA, 15 Civ. 5920 (AMD) (LB), 2017 WL 3868801, at *2 (E.D. N.Y. Sept.
5, 2017) (concluding that the responding parties “fully complied” with their preservation obligation
by preserving the relevant videotaped footage).
188. The Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 195-96.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 196.
191. Id. at 196-97.
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there is an intent to deprive, but no irretrievable loss. 192 However, while
it is true that remedies are not available under Rule 37(e) merely because
a party acts with reprehensible intent, 193 that does not necessarily exclude
the exercise of a court’s inherent powers to deal firmly with a party under
similar circumstances. 194
XI. CONCLUSION
The Third Edition of the Principles is a worthy successor to the
Second Edition and, in many respects, a substantial improvement,
reflecting both the passage of time and the clarification of the underlying
Principles. The drafting team for the Third Edition had the advantage of
understanding the actual evolution in technology and the law since the
Second Edition was published, and have solidly built on that knowledge.
The contents of the Third Edition are, on balance, respectful of the
legitimate needs of all participants in the electronic discovery process and
should be flexible enough to adjust to the inevitable and unpredictable
changes ahead.

192. Id. at 197 cmt. 14.d. (giving an illustration of when a court might impose sanctions “[u]nder
the concepts of this Principle 14 (but not Rule 37(e)”).
193. The Standing Committee deleted the statement that “there may be rare cases where a court
concludes that a party’s conduct is so reprehensible that serious measures should be imposed even in
the absence of prejudice.” Minutes, Standing Comm. Mtg., (May 29-30, 2014), at n.2.
194. See Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2012) (imposing
sanctions for bad-faith conduct under inherent authority since the focus is on the “purpose rather than
the effect”).
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APPENDIX: THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES
(THIRD EDITION)

1. Electronically stored information is generally subject to the
same preservation and discovery requirements as other
relevant information.
2. When balancing the cost, burden, and need for electronically
stored information, courts and parties should apply the
proportionality standard embodied in Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1) and in state equivalents, which requires
consideration of the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access
to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefits.
3. As soon as practicable, parties should confer and seek to
reach agreement regarding the preservation and production
of electronically stored information.
4. Discovery requests for electronically stored information
should be as specific as possible; responses and objections
to discovery should disclose the scope and limits of the
production.
5. The obligation to preserve electronically stored information
requires reasonable and good faith efforts to retain
information that is expected to be relevant to claims or
defenses in reasonably anticipated or pending litigation.
However, it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every
conceivable step or disproportionate steps to preserve each
instance of relevant electronically stored information.
6. Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the
procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for
preserving and producing their own electronically stored
information.
7. The requesting party has the burden on a motion to compel
to show that the responding party’s steps to preserve and
produce relevant electronically stored information were
inadequate.
8. The primary sources of electronically stored information to
be preserved and produced should be those readily
accessible in the ordinary course. Only when electronically
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stored information is not available through such primary
sources should parties move down a continuum of less
accessible sources until the information requested to be
preserved or produced is no longer proportional.
Absent a showing of special need and relevance, a
responding party should not be required to preserve, review,
or produce deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual
electronically stored information.
Parties should take reasonable steps to safeguard
electronically stored information, the disclosure or
dissemination of which is subject to privileges, work product
protections, privacy obligations or other legally enforceable
restrictions.
A responding party may satisfy its good faith obligations to
preserve and produce relevant electronically stored
information by using technology and processes, such as
sampling, searching, or the use of selection criteria.
The production of electronically stored information should
be made in the form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained or that is reasonably usable given the nature of
the electronically stored information and the proportional
needs of the case.
The costs of preserving and producing relevant and
proportionate electronically stored information ordinarily
should be borne by the responding party.
The breach of a duty to preserve electronically stored
information may be addressed by remedial measures,
sanctions, or both: remedial measures are appropriate to cure
prejudice; sanctions are appropriate only if a party acted with
intent to deprive another party of the use of relevant
electronically stored information.
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